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Abstract:  
 
In the aftermath of the East Asian crisis of 1997/98, much attention was given to the need 
for financial sector reform. While little of substance has changed in the intervening years, 
a number of potentially important new forums were established to facilitate international 
cooperation in the financial sector. This paper attempts to provide a theoretical context 
within which to explore one of these institutions – the G20. By drawing on theories of 
hegemony and regimes, this paper identifies the – potentially competing - political and 
institutional logics that have driven what change there has been. The key question we 
address is whether institutions like the G20 are likely to provide genuine mechanisms for 
the resolution of collective goods problems, or – in the short term, at least - instruments 
for hegemonic business as usual. Even if the G20 proves incapable of facilitating 
international cooperation in the short-term, some sort of multilateral cooperation is 
ultimately necessary, we suggest, if the international financial system is to avoid the 
potential dangers of hegemonic instability. 
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Introduction 
One of the most striking features of the contemporary international financial system has 
been an expansion in its size and reach, and a simultaneous increase in its susceptibility 
to crisis and instability. This is important for a number of reasons. Most obviously, it 
presents a practical challenge for economic actors and policy-makers as they attempt to 
cope with seemingly regular and inevitable bouts of economic dislocation, particularly in 
the ‘emerging market’ economies. Important as such practical issues are, however, there 
are other consequences of financial instability that raise important theoretical and even 
ideological questions: first, is there something about the nature of ‘deregulated’ financial 
regimes that makes them more crisis-prone? Is the particular international financial order 
that has emerged under the auspices of American hegemony in the post-Bretton Woods 
period especially susceptible to instability as a consequence? More fundamentally, 
perhaps, is the United States – the hegemonic power of the era – contributing to the 
instability of international financial system through potentially unsustainable domestic 
and foreign policies? 
 
As a consequence of such practical, theoretical and, by implication, normative questions, 
a major debate has developed about the nature and management of international financial 
relations. The financial crisis that engulfed East Asia in the late 1990s was especially 
important in highlighting both the practical dangers that flowed from a ‘premature’ 
liberalisation of capital accounts, and the political vulnerability of affected countries as a 
consequence. In the aftermath of the crisis, not only was there a heightened perception of 
East Asia’s exposure to external economic and political forces, but there was greater 
interest in attempting to develop regional mechanisms with which to ward-off similar 
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future catastrophes. Significantly, however, interest in exploring new regulatory and 
cooperative arrangements was not confined to either regional players or those most badly 
affected by crises in East Asia, Latin America or Russia. On the contrary, as a direct 
consequence of this series of rolling crises, interest in developing a ‘new financial 
architecture’ became increasingly widespread. This ultimately led to the deve lopment of 
new institutions like the G20, which were specifically designed to provide a forum in 
which both the ‘north’ and the ‘south’, the creditor and the debtor nations, and the rule-
makers and the rule-takers might come together to discuss and possibly manage common 
systemic problems. 
 
It is important to acknowledge at the outset that this nascent process is still probably too 
new to have had much practical impact, and that some of the heat has, in any case, gone 
out of the debate of late. Nevertheless, the G20 process has the potential to cast a 
revealing light on some of the most important regulatory issues and processes in the 
contemporary, increasingly global economy. Indeed, the possibility that the G20 might 
degenerate into something of a talk-shop, or a mechanism with which to provide the 
veneer of inclusion and cooperation while actually contributing to ‘hegemonic’ business-
as-usual is - from the perspective of students of international political economy, at least - 
of great importance; even if it may prove disappointing to many of the more marginal 
participants. To make a judgement about this – whether new institutions like the G20 are 
institutional fig leafs or more inclusive elements of a new international financial 
architecture that reflects a wider array of participants – we need a conceptual framework 
that allows us to identify the political dynamics that are potentially at play in such 
institutions. This paper is intended to provide such a framework through an historically-
informed theoretical analysis that highlights the pivotal role of the United States. Our 
central contention is that if the new financial architecture is to amount to anything more 
than a rhetorical flourish and sop to critics of the prevailing America-centric order, then 
institutions like the G20 will have to provide forums for genuine participation and power-
sharing – something that will inevitably diminish American influence and hegemony as a 
consequence. 
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The paper is organised in the following way. First we provide a brief discussion of the 
development of the contemporary international financial governance system (IFGS) that 
has developed under the auspices of American hegemony and the theoretical debates that 
have emerged as a consequence. In the second part we explore the development of the 
G20 and what we argue are the competing functional and political logics that are present 
within it, and which threaten to fundamentally undermine such organisations as a 
consequence. It will be extremely difficult, we suggest, for bodies like the G20 to achieve 
their goal of reflecting a wider array of views and interests about how the IFGS should be 
managed if the United States remains hostile to multilateral constraints and pursues 
domestic and foreign policies that threaten the stability of the overall system. Interpolated 
throughout the paper are examples of the implications of the evolution of the IFGS that 
are drawn primarily from the East Asia region, which provides a useful illustrative case 
study because many of the governing ideas and regimes found there are distinctive and 
not congruent with the dominant neoliberal model, and because the East Asian crisis 
provided a powerful catalyst for debates about the need for reform of the international 
financial architecture. 
 
The evolution of the international financial governance system 
 
The contemporary IFGS emerged from a particular set of historical circumstances. There 
is now a substantial literature that deals with the establishment and operation of the 
original Bretton Woods institutions (Block 1997; Eichengreen and Kenen 1994), but it is 
worth briefly spelling out what some of their most important features were as they 
provide a revealing comparative perspective with the contemporary situation. Two 
factors were especially distinctive components of the old order: the nature and influence 
of American hegemony, and the governance of the international financial sector through 
institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
 
Charles Kindleberger’s (1973) influential analysis of the Great Depression was 
instrumental in popularising and legitimating the idea that the international economic 
system needed a ‘hegemonic’ power to provide stability through the institutionalisation 
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of a rule-governed economic order. The economic, political and strategic dominance of 
the United States in the aftermath of World War II meant that only it could fulfill this 
role. The fact that American hegemony emerged in the context of the Cold War, 
however, gave a distinctive quality to American dominance, one in which economic 
liberalism was tempered by the geopolitical imperatives that emerged as a consequence 
of the Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union (Latham 1997). It was, according to 
some observers, a system in which American power was constrained and 
institutionalised, providing powerful incentives for allies to acquiesce to American 
dominance (Ikenberry 1998). To some extent, at least, strategic considerations trumped 
more narrowly cast national or sectional economic goals. This has two further important 
consequences: on the one hand the influence of financial capital was minimised in the 
construction of the post-Cold War order. On the other, significantly different types of 
capitalist organization and development occurred within the overall context of the bipolar 
strategic stand-off. American hegemony currently operates in a very different set of 
strategic and ideological circumstances, conditions that facilitate greater unilateralism on 
the part of the US and which potentially constrain the room for manoeuvre of other states 
in the international system as a consequence. Indeed, some argue that the growing 
preference for unilateralism in American foreign policy is an expression of, and 
underpinned by, America’s military dominance and objectives, with the consequence that 
‘the Bush administration’s adoption of unilateral preventative military action undercut the 
international rules and norms on which commerce depends’ (Johnson 2004: 257). 
 
Clearly, the ‘securitisation’ of US foreign policy, which has seen a (re)privileging of 
strategic over economic goals (Higgott 2004), has the capacity to profoundly affect the 
conduct of international financial relations, not least because of the unforeseeable impact 
geopolitical events may have on market confidence. And yet an overly state-centric 
analysis of US power may underestimate the other distinctive quality of the post-war 
international order that is of particular importance for the purposes of this essay: 
international financial relations under the original Bretton Woods regime were 
comparatively highly regulated, capital movements were relatively small, and exchange 
rate movements were managed - largely through the efforts of the IMF. In the early phase 
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of American hegemony, and as a consequence of its perceived role in triggering the inter-
war economic crisis, international finance was seen as potentially dangerous, and 
something that needed close regulation (Helleiner 1993). In the immediate post-war 
period, the US was prepared to play a stabilising role in a system that revolved around a 
fixed notional value for the American dollar relative to gold. However, when this policy 
became increasingly unsustainable because of the US’s deteriorating geopolitical and 
economic position, it was abruptly abandoned, ushering in an era of floating exchange 
rates and the exponential growth of financial markets. 
 
While this story is by now well known, it merits brief recapitulation, because it is sharply 
at odds with the current situation. Not only has the role and arguably the legitimacy of the 
United States as a stabilising force changed as a consequence of events it set in train 
when it ‘closed the gold window’ and effectively terminated the old order (Gowa 1983), 
but the underlying dynamics of the system have changed in important ways, too. The 
historical development of the IMF, which has seen it evolve from a mainstay of a 
regulated system of financial relations, to a position in which it is a champion of greater 
deregulation and market-determined exchange rates, is emblematic of this transformation 
(Pauly 1997). In effect, the period from the demise of the ‘old’ Bretton Woods order in 
the early 1970s until September 11 saw inter-governmental organisations like the IMF 
become increasingly important elements of the IFGS. Significantly, however, this did not 
necessarily mark a decline in the power or influence of the United States. On the 
contrary, American hegemony and the norms and principles associated with the 
‘Washington consensus’, were institutionalised within, and promoted by, a number of key 
international financial institutions (IFIs) over which the US exercised a disproportionate, 
but arms-length influence. The recognition that the IFIs were not independent, but closely 
associated with a particular set of ideological assumptions, policy prescriptions, as well 
as sectional and national interests (Bhagwati 1998; Woods 2003), generated a 
undercurrent of opposition to IFI policy, ultimately providing part of the impetus for calls 
for a new institutional architecture. 
 
Theoretical implications  
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Paradoxically enough, therefore, there has been a fundamental transformation in the way 
the IFGS operates during the last fifty years or so, but one that is shot-through with 
important continuities – the most important of which is the persistence of American 
hegemony. Conceptualising such changes - especially the crucial role played by the US in 
either directly shaping or underpinning particular international orders – is, therefore, no 
simple matter. However, one of the most striking differences between the original Bretton 
Woods system and the subsequent order that emerged during the 1970s was the degree of 
intentionality that characterised the first period: the Bretton Woods institutions were the 
purposeful creations of the victorious capitalist powers and what we might now call 
policy entrepreneurs like Harry Dexter White and Maynard Keynes (Ikenberry 1992). 
The post-Bretton Woods order, by contrast, developed in a much more ad hoc, unplanned 
manner. This basic distinction provides a useful point of departure for making sense of 
the various phases of American dominance and their impact on the workings of the IFGS, 
and for thinking about the possible development of institutions like the G20 in the context 
of a more unilateral exercise of American power. 
 
The two broad phases in the development of the IFGS and in the evolution of American 
hegemony are important because they highlight the different, inter- linked constitutive 
dynamics that underpinned them. Whereas the American government played a central 
role in directly shaping the early post-war order, the latter period has been characterised 
more by government-at-a-distance,1 in which both the increasingly powerful inter-
governmental institutions established at Bretton Woods and a greatly expanded private 
sector have played much more prominent parts in the IFGS. There was a certain 
inevitability about this turn of events: in a system in which the dominant actor had 
unilaterally abrogated the sort of pivotal role it played in the earlier system, and in which 
transnational financial interactions and integration were expanding rapidly, there was a 
systemic, functional necessity for the provision of a regulatory  infrastructure to allow 
cross-border financial relations to expand (Cerny 1995). In the absence of a more directly 
interventionist system dominated by the US, other forms of regulation needed to be 
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developed. It was not obvious what form this would take, however, nor how American 
hegemony would operate within this evolving context. 
 
There is a substantial literature that seeks to conceptualise the nature of hegemony from a 
number of distinct and potentially incompatible perspectives (Beeson forthcoming). For 
our purposes, however, what is significant about these diverse approaches is that they 
have the capacity to illustrate different phases in the development of the IFGS, the 
different dynamics at work within them, and the nature of American power at different 
historical moments. They also have the potential to highlight the challenges facing 
emergent organisations like the G20, which must seek to accommodate the potentially 
incompatible objectives of American foreign policy, the policy preferences of the 
controllers of mobile financial assets associated largely but not exclusively with the US, 
and the hitherto neglected and unrepresented interests of the emerging market economies 
- to say nothing of the world’s poor and disenfranchised. 
 
Although ‘realist’ theorists of hegemony are notoriously deficient in their analyses of the 
domestic sources of international behaviour generally, foreign policy in particular, and 
the importance of non-material influences in the operation of the international system, 
realist analyses do provide a useful reminder that the wider geopolitical system, and 
narrow calculation of ‘national’ strategic interests can become the dominant characteristic 
of hegemonic power at particular moments in history (Mearsheimer 2001). This was 
plainly the case for much of the Cold War, and has become increasingly important once 
again in the context of the ‘war on terror’, which has witnessed a concomitant re-
securitisation of American foreign policy. 2 What these sorts of analyses fail to provide, of 
course, are convincing explanations of the way hegemonic policy preferences are 
pursued, institutionalised and realised in non-military contexts. Liberal theorists have 
been at the forefront in developing explanations of America’s ideational and cultural 
hegemony or ‘soft power’, and the benefits that flow from it as a consequence (Nye 
2002). Plainly, if allies and followers can be persuaded of the attractions of American 
‘leadership’, this potentially reduces the transaction costs associated with dominance. 
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What is generally not apparent in many liberal readings of American power, however, is 
that it is not necessarily benign, desirable or universally welcomed. 
 
It has been the ability of critical theory to account for America’s ideological dominance 
in the face of potential opposition, as well as doubts about the efficacy and neutrality of 
the policies it has promoted – either directly or indirectly through the IFIs – that has 
given it greater analytical purchase. Robert Cox’s (1987) influential depiction of the 
interaction between material, ideational and institutional forces, remains an important 
starting point in attempting to understand the development of the IFGS. And yet the 
precise way hegemonic influence is realised is more complex than some of Cox’s early 
formulations imply: the sort of ideational/ideological hegemony implicit in such 
Gramscian- inspired readings has never been entirely realised in the way we might expect. 
This is a potentially serious difficulty for critical readings of American hegemony 
because of the emphasis Cox (1987: 7) placed on elite support of the dominant ideology 
in both the core and the ‘periphery’. It is especially striking that in parts of East Asia, for 
example, there has been long-standing and continuing opposition to both the Washington 
and post-Washington consensus (Beeson and Islam 2005), despite the apparent ideational 
dominance of neoliberal ideas associated with the US and its institutional allies.  
 
One way of conceptualising the inter-play of hegemonic power and acquiescence (or 
even resistance), is to think about the formation of specific regimes of governance and 
the role played by particular institutions within them. Specific institutions like the IMF, 
the World Trade Organisation and the World Bank clearly play a critical role in defining 
and promoting ‘the sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision 
making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge’ (Krasner 1983: 2). The 
point to emphasise, though, is that some actors clearly have a much greater capacity to 
shape such rules and principles than others. Not only are some governments rule-takers 
rather than rule-makers (Beeson and Bell forthcoming), but private sector actors like 
multinational corporations can cooperate with powerful governments to shape the 
international regulatory environment to reflect their interests (Sell 2000). Even more 
importantly for the purposes of this discussion, some areas of the world are seriously 
 11 
under-represented in key institutions like the IMF. Even East Asia, which we might 
expect to enjoy a prominent position in such institutions on the basis of its increased 
economic weight alone - to say nothing of compelling demographic considerations - 
remains remarkably under-represented (Rapkin and Strand 2003).  
 
This inherent institutionally-embedded disparity of power and influence, in which the 
developed economies of the Untied States, and to a lesser extent Western Europe, 
dominate the key decision-making bodies of the IFGS is compounded by the explicit, 
highly influential proselytising and policy-making roles of the IFIs. Again, East Asia 
illustrates how even a potentially powerful region can be constrained by the actions of 
other governments and private sector actors. On the one hand the East Asian crisis 
highlighted just how vulnerable the region was to the new economic dynamics that 
underpin the international financial system, and the political leverage that could be 
applied to the region in the context of crisis management (Wade 2001; Beeson 2003). 
What was equally noteworthy, however, was the way in which the IFIs (with American 
backing) took the opportunity to attempt the ‘discursive demolition of the East Asian 
development model’ (Hall 2003). In other words, despite East Asian elites frequently 
being unconvinced about either the wholesale adoption of ‘Anglo-American’ modes of 
economic organisation, or the complete abandonment of their own alternatives, the 
combined political and ideological assault on the part of the US-backed IFIs have helped 
to entrench neoliberal ideas across the region (Ravenhill 2004). 
 
What we have witnessed in the IFGS, therefore, are two broad phases of American 
hegemony in which the US has moved from directly shaping the institutional architecture 
and its operational principals, to one in which it has increasingly operated at a distance. 
In this latter period policy development and institutional evolution has been 
comparatively ad hoc, and seen a greater array of players becoming part of the decision-
making and regulatory processes (see Braithwaite and Drahos 2000; Cutler et al 1999). 
Crucially, however, the expansion of actors has not necessarily worked to the advantage 
of the developing world, or even those OECD countries that favour policy reforms that 
are at odds with Anglo-American orthodoxy promoted by the US and its institutional 
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allies. The key question, therefore, is whether new institutions like the G20 can actually 
provide a forum in which genuine, open-ended dialogue about policy (see below) and 
possible reform of the international financial architecture can occur. This is an especially 
pressing concern given that we may be at the beginning of a third phase of American 
hegemony, one that shares the preoccupation with geopolitics that distinguished the first 
period, but which is increasing unilateral, rather than based on the multilateralism that 
was so distinctive of the immediate post-war period.  
 
The Development of, and Prospects for, the G20 
 
The G20 emerged alongside the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) as a direct consequence 
of a series of financial crises in the late 1990s. In addition to the members of the G7, the 
G20 contains a number of ‘emerging market’ economies that were especially badly 
affected by the crises,3 as well as ‘middle powers’ like Australia, which have been 
associated with policy innovation in the finance area. From the outset the two 
organisations had quite distinct roles. The FSF is ‘designed to coordinate the interests of 
industrialised and emerging market economies concerning regulatory issues’, while the 
G20 ‘seeks to facilitate direct and open debate about architectural issues’ (Germain 2001: 
416). Germain’s formulation is useful as it highlights the quite different logics and 
political dynamics that potentially inform the two organisations. On the one hand the FSF 
may be thought of as a mechanism for resolving the seemingly inescapable, functionally 
necessary ‘technical’ requirements of coordinating increasingly large scale transnational 
movements of financial capital. On the other hand, the G20 reflects and gives expression 
to the more explicitly political considerations that inevitably surround all regulatory 
issues: the specific membership of the G20 may be somewhat arbitrary and owe 
something to contingent circumstances, but its make-up primarily reflects a self-
conscious desire to make the ‘new financial architecture’ more politically inclusive and 
potentially reflect a greater diversity of views. For this reason the G20 provides a 
particularly useful laboratory within which to examine the dynamics of international 
cooperation in the context of evolving American hegemony. 
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Debating the G20 
 
It is worth emphasising at the outset, that the G20 largely owes its existence to 
intertwined changes in the nature of the IFGS and American hegemony. As we have seen, 
the IFGS had been moving toward a situation in which intergovernmental organisations 
played a more important regulatory and proselytising role, and in which – until S11, at 
least – American power was less overtly interventionist and arguably more institutionally 
constrained. Two factors provided crucial catalysts for the further consolidation and 
continuing institutionalisation of international cooperation, of which the G20 is a 
quintessential expression. First, the East Asian crisis sparked an important and continuing 
debate about the nature, effectiveness and stability of the international financial 
architecture. Simply on ‘technical’ grounds it was clear that there were powerful reasons 
for questioning whether the liberalisation of capital flows in emerging market economies 
was beneficial when rapidly changing market sentiment could effectively decimate even 
comparatively well-run economies virtually overnight. At the very least, events like the 
East Asian crisis drew widespread attention to the question of ‘sequencing’ (Caprio et al 
2000), or the need to develop sound financial institutions and mechanisms of regulatory 
oversight before wholesale capital liberalisation occurred. 
 
The second factor that sparked debate about the nature of the international financial 
architecture was longer-standing, but was given additional impetus by the financial crises 
of the late 1990s (Kenen 2001). For a number of years critics in the developing world and 
‘global civil society’ had drawn attention to the inequitable impact of decision-making 
within the key institutions of what were becoming increasingly global processes of 
governance (O’Brien et al 2000). The East Asian crisis in particular not only had the 
effect of highlighting the impact of questionable policy initiatives emerging from the 
IFIs, but expanded the debate significantly to include members of the IFI establishment, 
like ex-World Bank chief economist, Joseph Stiglitz. Not only did Stiglitz (2002) provide 
a scathing critique of the World Bank’s sister organization, the IMF, but he suggested 
that its discredited policy prescriptions flowed from its unhealthily close, self-serving 
relationship with ‘Wall Street’. The concomitant championing of capital account 
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liberalisation, no matter how inappropriate it may be for particular countries, was seen as 
a direct consequence of this political and economic nexus. 
 
This claim about the relationship between supposedly independent inter-governmental 
agencies and particular economic interests overwhelmingly associated with a specific 
country is important for a number of reasons. First, some observers have argued that 
decision-making processes in the emerging international financial architecture have 
become ‘genuinely intergovernmental’ (Germain 2001: 421). In this context, it is argued, 
institutions like the G20 are key expressions of, and mechanisms for, the ‘politics of 
inclusion’, in which ‘emerging market economies are able to affect the way in which the 
global financial system is governed’ (Germain 2001: 421). Likewise, it is the expectation 
that the regulatory initiatives of the G20 will reflect a plurality of views and emerge as a 
consequence of open-ended discussions in which participants have an equal opportunity 
for policy input that leads Porter to emphasise the potential importance of the G20 as an 
instrument of discursive legitimation. However, as Porter perceptively observes: 
 
The FSF and the G20 are not simply the result of powerful states or business actors 
autonomously pursuing their interest. Nor do they result from a more horizontal process of 
bargaining in which states collaborate for their mutual benefit. Rather they were created by 
powerful states to obtain voluntary compliance of weaker states (Porter, mimeo – emphasis 
added). 
 
In this interpretation the politics of inclusion are certainly important, but not because the 
international financial system throws up technical challenges that can only be resolved 
through the participation of all affected actors. Rather, the politics of inclusion is crucial 
to provide an ideological legitimacy for the preferences of the powerful by clothing them 
in the language of participation. Despite all the rhetoric about the importance of inclusion 
and participation, therefore, as Armijo (2002: 53) pithily observes, the reality seems to be 
that ‘the shape of the current debate over reform primarily reflects the distribution of elite 
opinion within the United States – not in the larger world’. And yet, while the US and 
particular interests associated with mobile capital may desire to promote a particular 
neoliberal policy framework based around agendas of capital opening and transparency, 
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the key question to be empirically determined is whether they have the capacity to do so 
– particularly if there is a functional requirement to include other countries and actors that 
may have quite different views about the future course of regulatory reform.  
 
The key issues at stake in these competing versions of an IFGS, therefore, essentially 
revolve around the competing underlying logics regarding what might be called the 
‘politics of coordination’ and the ‘politics of inclusion’.  Increasingly, the international 
financial system itself entails heightened levels of integration and greater exposure to 
shared vulnerabilities regarding financial calamities, whilst the IFGS confronts the 
problem of multiple national authorities operating in an increasingly integrated global 
financial system.  The corollary of effective governance in such a situation therefore 
implies collective responses and coordinated activity across countries, particularly in 
terms of information flows, regulatory cooperation and a broader shared vision of how 
the system should be managed.  Increasingly, this appears as a structural characteristic of 
the system, entailing as it does a ‘strong functional argument’ for the politics of 
coordination (Germain 2001: 414). An apparent functional corollary of this entails the 
politics of inclusion, in which a range of key stakeholder countries are brought into an 
institutionalised consensus forming, if not decision making, arena.  The aim, of course, is 
to mobilise effective collective action across countries and to provide a legitimate basis 
(via inclusion) for joint action. As Paul Martin (2001), Canada’s Prime Minister, and a 
major advocate of the G20 has argued, new rules and policies pertaining to an IFGS ‘will 
work only if the developing countries and emerging markets help shape them, because 
inclusiveness lies at the heart of legitimacy and effectiveness’. Evidence that there are 
structural and related functional logics underpinning arguments about how to construct an 
effective IFGS also come from writers such as Fred Bergsten (2004) and others (Bradford 
and Linn 2004), who argue that extant policy coordination problems combined with the 
rapid rise of powerful economies like China and India means that there is little choice 
(either now or eventually) but to include such actors in the IFGS.  
 
The crucial issue, however, is whether such countries will comply with the sort of agenda 
that has been promoted by the US and the IFIs, or whether other more ‘interventionist’ 
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models and policy innovations will be canvassed and possibly adopted. Thus far there is 
evidence that the US sponsored neoliberal model involves coordinated efforts primarily 
aimed at promoting policies such as capital liberalisation, as well as joint regulatory and 
transparency agendas. Yet the neoliberal agenda as primarily promoted by the US (and 
like-minded allies), is relatively hierarchical, and is essentially a form of hegemonic 
influence exercised through institutions. In other words, as currently constituted the G7, 
and perhaps the G20, are venues through which American (or more broadly western 
alliance) power is exercised and its dominant position maintained. If this reading is 
correct, the G-20 becomes a forum for ‘incorporation’ rather than genuine inclusion. 
Indeed, as Porter (2000: 17) argues, the G-20 should be seen as a forum for selling and 
‘legitimating G-7 policies’, that ‘will in the immediate future continue to be a mechanism 
for upgrading the involvement of non-G-7 countries while maintaining careful limits on 
their power’.   
 
Yet it is clear that there have already been tensions and conflicts within the G-20, largely 
between those who advocate continuing neoliberal reform and those who favour greater 
stabilisation (eg. Agence France Press 1999). As Armijo (2002) has pointed out, there are 
fundamental and potentially irreconcilable differences between those who advocate 
policies which are primarily market driven and which reject government ‘interference’ 
(laissez-faire liberalisers, in his terms), and those who advocate greater intervention and 
stabilisation of a system that is judged to be inherently crisis-prone. The crucial point to 
emphasise in this context is that if the ‘stabilization agenda’ is taken seriously, it requires 
the coordinated, cooperative participation of member states to underwrite possible 
regulatory mechanisms like: Tobin taxes, capital controls, private sector bail- ins, or the 
establishment of an international lender of last resort (Armijo 2002). The stabilisation 
agenda thus poses a direct challenge to US-style dominance as it necessitates institutional 
reform and power sharing on a wider multilateral basis. In this case, the ‘politics of 
inclusion’ is not simply a fig leaf for continuing American cum neoliberal dominance, but 
a genuine, functionally necessary reform that requires more equitable and widespread 
participation in the IFGS. The G20 is a key site within which these contradictory goals 
and trends will be debated and perhaps resolved. 
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The development of the G20 
 
The G20 is essentially a creation of the G7, and its inauguration in 1999 is a reminder of 
the extant distribution of power in the international system: without the imprimatur and 
active participation of the dominant powers in the IFGS, it is difficult for new groupings 
to emerge that will have some realistic prospect of influencing policy debates or actively 
participating in regulatory processes. The G7 had already begun to pay more attention to 
issues of financial regulation and management from the mid 1990s, but the G20 emerged 
as a consequence of the ad hoc activities of the G22, the membership of which was 
determined partly by policy activism in the area of financial regulation, and partly by the 
US acting ‘unilaterally and peremptorily’ (Porter mimeo: 11). The US effectively 
established the G20 in the same way that it had created the earlier G22 and Willard 
Group, demonstrating its unique capacity to bypass or create new organisations, and 
operate unilaterally or multilaterally as it chooses (Foot et al 2003). Despite this 
potentially inauspicious start in which the nascent organisation owed its existence to an 
exercise of hegemonic influence, and despite the fact that the G20 has only been 
existence for a very short time, it has, according to some observers, shown some capacity 
for  an ‘autonomous impact’ (Kirton 2005: 3). 
 
In this regard the G20 clearly benefited from having Canadian Finance Minister Paul 
Martin as its inaugural chair. Martin enthusiastically promoted the initial division of 
labour envisaged for G20 and the FSF, in which the latter would handle the technicalities 
of coordinating international financial sector regulatory arrangements, whilst the G20 
provided a forum for consensus-building and debate about ‘big picture’ policy issues. 
The inaugural Ministerial conference in Berlin in 2000 provided precisely the sort of 
free-ranging discussion that Martin had hoped for, and significantly established the idea 
of consensus-based approach to decision-making which, according to Kirton (2005: 7) 
‘eroded any initial hope or fear that the G20 would be a forum for the rapid legitimation 
of US-bred, G7 approved ideas for IMF and international financial system reform’. In 
other words, if the G20 debates were truly open-ended and the decisions making process 
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was one which reflected some common ground between all participants, then the ability 
of a single country to force compliance in particular issue areas would necessarily be 
constrained. Subsequent meetings, especially the Montreal Ministerial of October 2000, 
were instrumental in consolidating the G20’s wide-ranging and ‘progressive’ agenda. 
From the outset, and directly reflecting the G20’s diverse membership, the G20 has 
concerned itself with the sorts of normative and distributional questions that are 
associated with the negative impacts of global processes, but which have hitherto 
generally been the subject of pious platitudes, rather than substantive reformist initiatives. 
Given that the G20 has set itself the ambitious task of attempting to ‘manage 
globalization’ in a way that retains the benefits that are expected to flow from increased 
economic integration and the diffusion of democratic norms, while ameliorating the 
negative effects of global competition, a fundamental test of its efficacy will be its ability 
to play a significant role in issues such as debt relief and the achievement of the 
Millennium Development Goals – topics that have been canvassed at G20 meetings and 
which enthusiasts consider as indicative of the grouping’s distinctive potential role in 
bridging the gap between various constituencies in the international system. 
 
At this stage, however, and despite the increased frequency with which meetings of 
members have been held, the expansive nature of its discussions, and suggestions that it 
should be upgraded to a regular leaders’ meeting, even some of its most ardent and 
persuasive admirers concede that at this stage there are ‘few signs that the G20 had 
become, or was even trending toward becoming, an institution strong enough to replace 
the G7/8 at the level of either the finance ministers or leaders themselves’ (Kirton 2005: 
20). Thus far, therefore, the G20 appears to have been useful primarily as an intermediary 
mechanism for transmitting the basic principles that have informed the G7/8 to a wider 
and more diverse array of countries. As such, it is not yet clear whether it can develop 
new regulatory initiatives that are more reflective of the ideas and values of the wider 
grouping (including those supporting a stabilisation agenda), or whether it has the 
capacity to implement an agenda that it is at odds with the policy preferences of the 
hegemon. 
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The G20 and hegemonic instability 
 
There is one key issue that illuminates both the capacity of the G20 to act in a counter-
hegemonic fashion, and the way hegemony itself operates in different circumstances. As 
Fred Bergsten (2004: 33) notes, one of the most important - but most neglected – policy 
questions in the contemporary international political economy is the management of 
exchange rates. It is an issue, Bergsten argues, that the G20’s membership makes it 
possibly uniquely qualified to address. And yet, if it is to do so, it will need to confront a 
number of issues that are so fundamental to perceived ‘American interests’ that is 
doubtful whether, absent a major systemic crisis, institutions like the G20 are likely to 
have much impact. At the very least, it presents a clear test case of the G20’s potential 
efficacy. 
 
Recognition of the US’s dependence upon inflows of foreign capital to underpin domestic 
consumption and its overall budgetary position is not something that is any longer 
confined to ‘radical’ scholars.4 Despite the fact that the dangers inherent in recent 
American policy are becoming more widely understood, it is worth briefly spelling out 
some of their key features as they highlight the possible limits to multilateral cooperation 
and the different strategies that are open to hegemonic powers. The first point to make is 
that the US’s dependence on foreign capital  is not necessarily a sign of vulnerability and 
weakness: US indebtedness is uniquely also a source of structural power that goes 
beyond the well-known benefits that flow from controlling the world’s reserve currency.5  
The major sources of capital inflows to the US – Japan and increasingly China – are also 
two countries which depend on continuing access to American markets. Despite the US’s 
apparent vulnerability to changes of sentiment in East Asia about the advisability of 
holding depreciating American assets, therefore, Japan and China will be reluctant to 
initiate a large scale diminution of their investments in the US for fear of precipitating the 
very crisis they fear. In other words, both sides are locked into a symbiotic relationship 
upon which they all depend, but which looks unsustainable in the long term. 
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Given the wider geopolitical context in which this set of relationships is embedded, and 
given the privileging of security concerns under the current Bush administration, it seems 
unlikely either that the source of this dangerous structural imbalance – American 
profligacy and indebtedness – will be seriously addressed by American policymakers, or 
that organisations like the G20 will have sufficient leverage to manage a negotiated 
outcome that seriously impinges on American autonomy. Indeed, it is significant that 
some of the key East Asian members of the G20 are moving to diversify their holdings of 
foreign currency (The Economist 2004). Of possibly even greater long term significance 
is the fact that Japan and China are also exploring regionally-based cooperative currency 
mechanisms with which to ward off future crises (Henning 2002),  rather than rely 
exclusively on more geographically diverse mechanisms like the G20, which may still be 
directly or indirectly dominated by the US. Indeed, it is important to recognise that the 
US is not necessarily viewed as a benign source of hegemonic stability and certainty in 
East Asia, but – especially in the wake of the financial crisis of 1997/98 - as a country 
that it is prepared to pursue its perceived national interests directly and through the 
auspices of the IFIs (Bowles 2002). 
 
In short, the Bush administration has demonstrated a general hostility, or at best, selective 
support for multilateral institutions. Such behaviour does not suggest that the US will be 
prepared to abide by any G20 resolutions that constrain its freedom of action in the 
interests of overall systemic stability. On the contrary, far from being a source of 
stability, American hegemony is potentially a source of major instability. The demise of 
the original Bretton Woods regime serves as a salutary reminder that in extremis, 
American foreign policy is likely to reflect narrowly conceived national interests first and 
foremost, rather than systemic ones – especially at a time of heightened national 
insecurity. Crucially, the sort of geopolitical constraint that the confrontation with the 
Soviet Union provided when the Bretton Woods system was at its most effective and 
institutionalised no longer applies, and American foreign policy has, in the words of one 
perceptive observer, become like ‘a geostrategic wrecking ball that will destroy 
America's own half-century old international architecture’ (Ikenberry 2004: 7). At a time 
when the US arguably presents the single greatest threat to the long-term stability of the 
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international financial system, but when it is governed by an administration that has 
shown itself especially unwilling to be constrained by external agencies and agreements, 
the prospects for the G20 to act as an agent of reasoned, plurilateral and effective policy 
advice looks rather bleak. 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
The contemporary IFGS displays some noteworthy paradoxes, some striking echoes of 
the past, and some enduring tensions between its functional requirements and its 
circumscribed capacity to deliver meaningful policy initiatives. The paradoxes revolve 
around the US’s highly ambiguous position as the both the central pillar of a highly 
institutionalized, cooperative, multilateral order, and its simultaneous role as a 
‘geostrategic wrecking ball’. At the very least this would seem likely to undermine the 
sort of legitimacy that was such an important part of the effective operation of the earlier 
Bretton Woods system, and upon which the consensus-oriented operational style of 
organizations like the G20 would seem to depend. If the principal architect and guarantor 
or a liberal, rules-based system cannot be relied upon to subscribe to the normative order 
it has so assiduously championed, then the future of cooperative multilateralism would 
seem to be in doubt. 
 
And yet, it is also clear that there is a requirement for some degree of international 
cooperation to ensure the continuing international economic integration and coordination. 
The question is upon what basis this occurs. What the history of institutional innovation 
in the post-war period seems to suggest is that the direction and configuration of the 
international system will inevitably reflect the geopolitical priorities of the hegemon at 
particular moments, as much as it does any strictly functional requirements. In this 
context the parallels between American policy in Iraq and Vietnam are not confined to 
the military sphere: it is important to remember that in the late 1960s and early 1970s the 
US experienced a similar period of ‘fiscal overstretch’ that culminated in a major, 
unilateral shift in foreign policy and a concomitant transformation of the entire IFGS. It is 
not inconceivable that a similar process may be unfolding as a consequence of current 
 22 
fiscal imbalances, which may produce similarly systemic changes as a consequence 
(Ferguson and Kotlikoff, 2003). 
 
All this suggests that hegemonic powers do not necessarily act in ways that are inevitably 
stabilizing, let alone altruistic. Nor is their status as the dominant power of the era 
necessarily as dependent on legitimacy and the inculcation of a specific normative order 
as some observers might like to believe (Rues-Smit 2004). On the contrary, the Bush 
administration finds itself in the remarkable position of unilaterally threatening the 
stability of a system it effectively created, and which continues to deliver it 
disproportionate benefits, despite the impact this will have on both its own legitimacy and 
the legitimacy of the multilateral order with which it is associated. If the institutionalized, 
multilateral cooperative architecture of the IFGS and the contemporary international 
order more generally cannot constrain hegemonic power it does not bode well for the 
ability of organizations like the G20 to generate and implement the sorts of policy 
innovations that appear to be so badly needed, but which are likely to be resisted by the 
current hegemonic power, absent a system-changing crisis. 
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Endnotes 
 
1 This formulation has been employed in a number of ‘post-structural’ accounts of new modes of 
governance in a number of OECD countries. Government is usefully distinguished from simple 
‘dominance’, and occurs through intervening institutions and practices, producing a form of self-
regulation. While the parallels are not exact, this sort of conceptualisation does provide one way 
of thinking about the less state-dominated  forms of control and regulation that characterise the 
contemporary IFGS. See Rose (1999), and for an interesting attempt top apply notions of 
‘governmentality’ to the international sphere, see Lipschutz (2002). 
2 Paul Wolfiwitz’s nomination to head the World Bank is a telling illustration of the way strategic 
interests and actors can spill-over into other areas in ways that seem likely to make international 
economic governance subordinate to long-term geopolitical objectives. 
3 Specifically, in addition to the original members of the G7 (the US, Britain, France, Germany, 
Italy, Canada and Japan), the G20 includes Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, China, 
South Korea, Indonesia, India, Mexico, Argentina, Brazil and Australia. 
4 The implications of the US’s increased indebtedness and budget deficits has become a subject of 
increasingly commonplace speculation and is reflected in the – thus far orderly – decline in the 
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value of the dollar. For one of the most important recent analyses of the American economy and 
its long-term structural problems, see Brenner (2002). 
5 For an original interpretation of the paradoxical benefits that accrue to the US as a consequence 
of its indebtedness, see Seabrooke (2001). On the more conventional benefits associated with 
‘seigniorage’, see Cohen (1998). 
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